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Promise　and　the　Allegiance　to　the　Government　in　Hume
Naoki　Yajima
Introduction
　　The　formation　of　the　concept　of　justice　is　decisive　for　the　formation　of
society，　because　with　the　belief　in　justice　human　be血gs　acqu廿e　a　new　mode
of　behaviour　that　is　unknown　in　the　state　of　nature．　The　first　rule　ofjustice，
which　prescribes　the　stability　ofproperty，　accompanies　the　concept　of　rights，
as　well　as　the　general　practice　of　abiding　by　the　nlles　of　justice丘om　moral
motivatioll　l．However，　the　stability　of　property　is　only　the　first　step　of
Hume’s　system　of　justice．　In　this　paper，　I　will　explore　how血e㎞t　law　of
justice　is　fbllowed　by　the　second　law，　the　transference　of　property，　then　by
the　third　law，　the　performance　of　promise．　These　are　derived　by　necessity
血om　the　first　law　of　justice．　Among　them，　Humels　theory　of　promise　is
particularly　significant．　This　is　because　Hobbes　and　Locke，　though　in
different　ways，　invoked　promise　as　a　means　of　establishing　and　legitimising
govemment．　Hobbes　and　Locke　resort　to　covenant　or　contract　for　explaining
the　fbundation　of　govemment，　assuming　them　to　be　fUndamental　laws．
Humeじs　theory　of　promise　inevitably　implies　a　challenge　to　his　two
predecessors，　especially　to　Locke　whose　theory　is　typically　recognised　as　a
social　contract　dleory．　This　paper，　theref｛）re，　attempts　to　clarify　the　concept
of　promise　with　its　critical　implication　fbr　social　contract　theory，　in　relation
to　Hume’s　epistemology．
　　Ifirst　outline　Hume曾s　overall　opinion　of　the　social　contract　in　his”Of
Original　Contractll　to　assess　Hume曾s　general　position　on　the　problems
regarding　promise　and　govemment．　Then，　I　explain　the　second　law　of
justice，　the　transference　of　property　by　consent　as　a　preliminary　step　fbr
Hume曾s　theory　of　promise．　I　argue　that　the　perfbrmance　of　promise　is
artificial　virtue　that　binds　people曾s　behaviour．　This　paper　clari丘es　that
government　is　also　a”compositionll（T　3．2．8．8）of　human　nature　in　a　similar
sense　as　the　extemal　body，　the　belief　in　which　is　crucial　for　stabilising　our
life．　Govemment　is　sustained　by　the　virtue　of　allegiance．　I　argue　that
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allegiance　to　government　is　founded　on　the　same　mechani，sm　as’　o曲elief　in
the　existence　of山e　extemal　body，　which　signifies　that　govemment　consists
in　the　general　point　of　view．
1．990f　Original　Contmct鱒
　　Modem　social　contract　theories　played　a　significant』role　in　justifシing　the
establistment　of　government　and　the　obligation　of　the　people　to　obey　the
govemment．　Ever　since　Jeremy　Bentham　referred　to　Hume　to　attack　social
colltract　theory　together　with　the　natulal　law　tradition　as　its　background，
Hume　has　been　known　as　a　critic　of　social　contract　theories．2　There　is　no
doubt　that　Hume　regards　social　contract　theory　as　a　major　target　of　his
criticism．　Hume，s　position　o紬e　social　con廿act　theory　is　clearly　developed
in　his”Of　t血e　Original　Contract”．　Though　he　is　critical　of廿le　social　colltract
theory，　he　does　not　simply　deny　the　social　contract　theory．　Hume　shows　an
understanding　of　what　the　social　contract　theory　might　offer　a　more　general
血eory　of　political　society．　He　has　a　common　motif　with　the　social　contract
thinkers，　the　wish　to　explain　the　origin　of　government，　and　also　the
obligation　to　submit　to　a　government．　Upon　the　evaluation　of　the
significance　of　social　contract山eoly，　Hume　attempts　to　replace　it　wi血his
own　theory　of　human　nature．　Hume　specifically　evaluates　Lockean　social
contract　theory．　Hume　acknowledges　that
When　we　consider　how　nearly　equal　a11　men　are　in　their　bodily　force，　and
even　in　their　mental　pOwers　and　facUlties，　till　cultivated　by　educa血011；we
must　necessarily　a皿ow，　that　nothing　but　their　own　consent　coUl¢　at　fu・st，
associate血em　together，　and　s画ect出㎝to　any肌血ority・The卿ple，　if　we
trace　government　tO　itS丘rst　orighl血the　woods　and　deserts，　are　the　source　of
al1　POwer　and　jurisdiction，　and　voluntarily，　for・the　sake　of　peace　and　order，
abandolled　their　native　liberty，　and　received　laws丘om　their　equal　and
companion．　The　con（litions，　upOn　which　they　were　Wi皿ing　to　submiち　were
either　expressed，　or　were　so　clear　and　obvious，　that　it　might　well　be
esteemed　superfluous　to　express　them．　If面s，血鉱be　meant　by血e　oゆal
contracちit　cannot　be　denie（L　that　all　govemment　is，　at　firsちfbunded　on　a
contract，　alld　that　the　most　allcient　rude　combinations　of　mankind　were
formed　chiefly　by　that　p血⑳le．（Essays，467－68）3
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Hume　agrees血at　given　the　natural　equality　of　human　capacities，　consent
is　the　only　means　to　create　one　authority　at　least　in　the　initial　establistment
of　any　government．　No　one　person　can　rule　many　others　by　his　physical
power．　But　Hume　dellies　that　collsent　is　the　only　justification　of　the　rule　of
government　in　the　more　mature　stage．　If　consent　is　the　sole　ground　fbr
submission，　people　are　allowed　to　abandon　the　authority　by　their　will　as
well．　Therefbre，　the　social　contract　theo】ry　justifies　a　right　to　resist　when　the
sovereign　fails　to　implemellt　the　contract．　Hume　shows　the　absurdity　of
social　contract　theory　by　pointing　out　that　such　a　practice　is　not　widely
observed　in　the　world（Cf．　Essの2s，469－70）．　Many　princes　regard　their
su止）j　ects　as　their　property　and　their　own　sovereignty　as　independ早nt　of　the廿
s呵ects．　Most　people　do　not　care　about　the　origin　of　their　govemment．
Commoll　people　acknowledge　the　authority　of　their　government　ollly
because　of　the　fact　that　their　ancestors　had　obeyed　the　govemment　fbr
generations．　Even　if　there　was　an　original　contract，　it　does　not　bind　later
generations．　Conside血g　past　practices　of　establish血g　a　new　govemment血
history，　it　is　obvious血at　the　force　to　demolish　the　old　govemment　gives
bmh　to　almost　any　govemment．　In　those　cases　people　are　forced　to　obey　the
new　govemment（Cf．　Essays，474）．
　　If　consent　is　made　by　force，　it　is　natural　that　the　consent　will　be
withdrawn　once　the　force　is　removed．　Hume　argues　that　mere　fbmal
consent　is　not　enough　unless　it　is　supPorted　by　some　spontaneous　principle．
Therefbre，　what　really　matters　is　not　the　consent　itself，　but　that　which　makes
the　consent　enduring．　Hume，s　enquiry　is　directed　to　the　conditions　under
which　meaning血l　collsellt　is　made．　The　Lockean　ground　f（）r　making　consent
the　only　and　sufiicient　condition　for　obedience　to　govemment　can　be　fo皿d
in　his　individualism．　Because　people　are　naturally丘ee，　independent，　and
equal，　only　their　consent　can　make　them　subj　ect　to　an　authority　other　than
themselves．　And，　if　they　consent　freely，　there　is　no　other　means　fbr　the
govemment　to　control　them．　Hobbes　thinks　that　a　covenant　by　force　or　under
threat　is　valid．　Locke　answers　that　because　human　beings　are　free，　they
CannOt　giVe　COnSent　by　f｛）rCe．
　　However，　the　problem　with　Locke’s　theory　is　that　it　does　not　explain　the
obligations　of　later　generations　who　are　llot　involved　ill　the　origi血al　contract．
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To　this　possible　criticism，　Locke　presents　a”tacit　consent”theory，　which
means　that　living薗血e　rule　of　the　government　is　itself　evidence　that　the
person　gives　tacit　consent　to止at　government．　However，　tacit　consent　is　a
contradictory　concept　because　consent　lies　in　its　explicitness．　Hume　thinks
this　compromised　fbrm　of　social　contract　Cannot　be　justified　unless　the
choice　is　realistically　practicable．　It　is　well　known　that　Hume　says，
Can　we　seriously　say，　that　a　poor　peasant　or　anisan　has　a丘ee　choice　to　leave
his　coun杜y，　when　he　knows　no　foreign　language　or　manners，　and　lives　ftOm
day的day，　by　the　sma皿wages　which　he　aeqUires？We　may　as　well　ass賦
that　a　man，　by　remaining　in　a　vessel，丘oely　consentS　tO　the　do血nion　of　the
mas愉；though　he　was　carried　on　bOard　wh皿e　aslegp．　And　must　leap　hlto廿1e
ocean，　and　peris転　the　moment　he　leaves　her．（Essの7s，475）
　　Hume　Iikens　the　British　Isle　to　a　ship　which　people　boarded”while
sleeping”．　Conse血t　can　be　a　ground　for　a　legitimate　government　only　if
people　can　disobey　government　whenever　they　do　not　like　it．　As　most　people
do　not　have　a　privilege　to　leave丘eely，　simply　living　there　does　not　mean
they　are　willing　to　obey　the　govemment．　Hume　also　points　out　that　people
are　placed　under　the　govemance　of　their　p血ce　even　if　they　leave　their　home
country，　as　the　Pilgrim　Fathers　did，　which　indicates　that　the　fbulldation　of
political　legitimacy　lies　outside　of　consent，　explicit　or　otherwise．　Where，
then，　does　the　legit血1acy　come丘om？Hume　makes　it　very　clear　that　both　the
obligation　to　allegiance　and　the　obligation　to　fidelity　owe　to”the　general
illterests　or　n［ecessities　of　society四．
If　the　reason　be　asked　of　that　obedience，　which　we　are　bound　to　pay　to
govemmenち1　readily　answer，わecause　society　could　not　otherwtSe　substSt：
And　this　answer　is　clear　and　intelligent　to　all　man　knd．　Your　answer　is，
becaiLse　we　should　keep　our　word．　But　besides，　that　no　body，　ti皿tm血ed血a
philosophical　sYsten1，　can　eilher　comprehend　or　relish　this　answer：Besides
血is，　I　say，　you　find　yourself　embarrassed，　when　it　is　asked　why　we　are
bound　t∂keep　our　word～Nor　call　you　give　any　answer，　but　what　woul（転
immediately，　without　any　c廿cuit，　have　accounted　for　our　obligation　to
aUegiance．（Essays，481）
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　　In　this　passage　Hume　reveals　the　crucial　connection　between　the
obedience　to　govemment　and　keeping　a　promise．　Hume　sees　the　defect　of
the　social　contract　theory　not　so　much　as　consisting　in　a　fiction　of　the
original　contract，　but　more　as　an　insu伍cient　explanation　of　the　nature　of
promise．　Without　underst｛mding　promise，　we　ca皿ot　understImd　obedience．
More　importantly，　Humels　theory　is　not　directly　addressing　the　problems
which　arise　when　we　should　resist　a　despotic　government．　These　arguments
cannot　be　made　sensible　unless　the　natUre　of　government，　obedience　and
promise　are　clarified．　Hume　considers　that　the　social　contract血eo琢rests　on
an　obscure　fbundation　regarding　these　significant　concepts．　Social　contract
theories　regard　these　concepts　as　rational，　but　in　fact　they　only　take　them　for
granted，　which　is　the　cause　oftheh・absurdity．
［1］na皿questions　with正egard　tr）morals，　as　well　as　Witicis鶏　there　iS　really　no
other　standard　by　which　any　controversy　ca血ever　be　decided．　And　nothing
is　a　clearer　pror）f，　that　a　theory　of　this　k㎞d　is　erroneous，　than　tO　fU（均that　it
leads　tO　paradoxes，即ug㎜t舳e　co㎜on蹴㎞㎝鰺of㎜㎞伽dむD
the　practice　and　opinion　of　all　nations　and　a皿stages．（Essays，486）
　　Thus，　Hume　recognises　the　importance　of　clarifンing　the　moral　concept
and　the　standard　of　morality．　He　distingUishes　the　moral　fact　that　we　should
obey　govemment　from　the　problem　about　which　government　is　more
desirable．　The　latter　decision　does　not　annihilate　the　fbrmer　fact．　Moral
norms血血e　final　ins臨e　should　be　clear　and　accessible　to”all　mankind”．
Hume，s　philosophy　is　penneated　by　this　attitude．　The　general　interest　of
society　is　inseparably　connected　to　the　duty　of　obedience，　and　produces　both
the　duty　of　obedience，　and　promise　keeping．　Where　there　is　no　duty　of
obedience，　there　is　no　duty　of　promise．　Therefbre，　it　is　in　vain　to　ascribe　the
former　to　the　latter．
The　general　obligationy　which　binds　us　to　governmeng　is　the血鵬働d
necessities　of　society，　and　this　obligation　is　very　st【く）ng．　The　dete　mm　nnation
of　it　to面s　or血at　particular　p血ce　or　form　Qf　government　is　frequently
more　uncertain　and　（t睦bious．　Present　possession　has　considerable　authority
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i血these　cases，　and　greater　than血private　property；because　of　the　disorders
which　attend　all　revolutions　and　changes　of　govemment．（Essays，486）
　　Hume　clearly　finds　the　largest　chance　of　social　improvement　in　safe
”commerce”．　Hume　finds　it　extraordinary　to　assert”伽励卿rθ脚owθア
in　a　state　cannot　takefrom　any　man，砂燃θMη4吻ositions，　any・paア’qズ
his　prop的，，　without　his　own　consent　or　that（ゾ乃∫5脚アesentatives”（E∬の，S，
italics　Hume，487）．　This　is　an）rthing　but　the　general　opinion　of　mankind．
What　matters　fbr　Hume　is　how　the　consistent　and　mqral　explanation　of
social　interest　and　necessity　which　produces　the　justice　of　promise　can　be
possible．　In　his　discussion　of　promise，　Hume　clarifies　the　mistake　of　the
social　colltract　theory　together　with　the　mistake　of　the　theory　of
individualism．
2．Relation　to　the　Preceding　Laws　of　Justice
　　We　have　seen　above　that　Hobbes　and　Locke　arrive　at　different
destinations　in　accordance　with　the　difference　of　their　initial　premises．　Hume
presents　a　theory　that　fbsters　the　ongoing　development　of　commercial
society，　free　both　from　the　Hobbesian　fear　of　anarchy　and　from　the　Lockean
fear　of　despotism．　Regarding　the　concept　of　promise，　Hume　argues　Hobbes
and　Locke　do　not　explain　the　concept　ofpromise　itself，　and　why　promise　has
amoral　power，　without　which　covenant　or　compact　does　not　make　sense．
Hume　says，
that　a　Pl「0〃lise　WOU’d〃0’わθintelligiわ1θ，わef～）re勉〃zan　conventions　had
es励1勧冨鵡αη4伽’｛rvenガ’加θ㎎’惚lligt’ble，　it　wou’d　notわe・attended
w泌4騨o肋わligation．（T　3。25．1，italics　Hume）
　　Both　Hobbes　and　Locke　have　a　provisional　answer　to　this　questio11．　But
both　answers　are　insufficient　fbr　understanding　the　whole　implications　of　the
concept．　The　Hobbesian　covenant　falls　short　of　a　promise　that　regulates
personal　relationships　between　individuals　without　political　authority。
Hobbes，s　covenant　is　an　once　and　fbr　all　determination：people　surrender
血eir　natural　rights　to舳common　sovereign．　The　performance　of　promise
血Hobbes　is　controlled　by　the　fear　of　authority．　But　this　is　not　a　Humean
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promise　that　serves　to　create　cooperative　bellaviour　of　people．　Hobbes　does
not　regard　promise　as　initiating　from　individual　ratiollality　because　his
methodological　individualism　camot　explaill　the　common丘amework　based
on　any血ing　other　than　individual　wills．
　　Locke　understandS　that　the　bildmg　force　of　a　promise　is　morality　which
derives丘om　llo　particular　cause　in　reality．　He　gro面ds　the　moral　obligatioll
to　keep　promises　in　natural　law；people　must　keep　promises　because　it　is　a
moral　duty　set　ultimately　by　the　will　of　God．　Locke　resorts　to　the　notion　of
contract　in　order　to　establish　a　bilatera1　relationship　betWeen　govemment
and　people．　He　considers　promise　to　be　the　requirement　of　moral　beings．4
Locke蜜s血eory　focuses　on　the　relationship　betWeen　govemment　and　people；
he　does　not　explain　the　principle　of　regulating　Private　relationships　alnong
ordinary　citizens．　This　is　also　reflected　in　the　individualistic　picture　of
human　beings　who　work　alone　on　nature　rather　than　in　cooperation　with
other　people．
　　Hume，s　imovation　is　to　explain　promise丘om　non－moral　premises　by
using　an　evolutionary　approach．　He　introduces　promise　as　the　third　law　of
jus廿ce　after　the　first　two　rules　of　justice：the　stabilisation　of　property，　and
the舳s免r　of　prope酬mu頭consent．　Hume　is　very　aware　of血e　fact　that
nothing　can　exist　independently　except　in　relation　to　its　proceeding
conditions．　This　also　applies　to　promise．　The　system　of　promise　does　not
exist血dependently　but　is　created　in　reaction　to　the　situation　that　necessitates
it．
　　Obviously，　promise　does　not　make　sense　without　the　situation　in　which　it
is　serviceable　to　human　beings．　Thus，　Hume　traces　the　origin　of　promise　to
the　llatural　state　befbre　justice　to　understand　what　situatioh　requires　the
system　of　promise．　Historical　and　evolutionary　considerations　make　it　all　too
clear　that　human　beings　cannot　be　independent．　First，　no　one　can　be　bom　to
oneself，　nor　can　one　sustain　one，s　own　life　by　oneself血to　adulthood．　This　is
enough　evidence　to　indicate　that　the　Hobbesian　picture　of　the　i血dependent
individual　is　impossible（though　Hobbes　indeed　demollstrates　the
impossibili切．　It　is　also　evident　that　human　beings　are　neither　free　nor　equal
by　na血e　o血er血an　in　moral　tems，　as　Locke　asserts．　For　Hume，　however，
the　concepts　of　freedom　or　equality　can　be　produced　in　a　highly
sophisticated　social　stage　only　by　vi］血le　of　the　system　ofjustice．
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　　It　is　not　arbitrary　that　the　first　law　ofjustice　is　the　stability　of　possessions，
because，　in　the　primitive　stage　of　human　development，　the　cause　of　conflicts
can　only　be　concrete　o止噸ects．　The　artificial　vtr加e　ofjustice　unites　society　by
anew　kind　of　relationship，　which　is　llot　based　on　perceptible　effects．
Paradoxically，　this　is　how　human　beings　can　become　concerned　With　society
as　a　whole　despite　their　psychological　and　physical　limitationsJustice
creates　a　new　type　of　mutuality　among　people．　Mutuality　develops
necessarily　because　it　is　essential　fbr　sustaining　a　social　life．　This　necessity
is　also　based　on　physical　limitation．　It　is　a　simple　fact　that　human　beings
camot　bring　with　themselves　everything　they　need　fbr　their　surviva1（though
Locke　might　say　the　whole　earth　is　given　fbr　them）．　People　seek　fbr　a
solution　to　this　di伍culty，　which　leads　to　the　next　development　of　the　law　of
jUS廿ce．
3．”Of　the　Transference　of　Property　by　Consent”
　　The　second　law　of　the　transference　of　property　by　consent　links　the　first
law　of　the　stability　of　possessions　and　the　third　law　of　promise　keeping．
Although　Hume，s　dealing　wi血this　second　law　is　quite　terse，　a　mere血ee
pages，　it　contains，　behind　its　plain　surface，　the　explanation　of　a　crucial　step
for　prepa血g　the　conventioll　of　promise．　First，　property　is　understood　as　a
mysterious　power　in　that　the　same　obj　ect　exerts　a　totally　different　power
depending　on　whether　one　is　its　owner　or　not．　This　reflects　Humels
㎜derstandhlg　of　morality　as　fbunded　on　causation．　Justice　is　a　particularly
human　mode　of　causation．　Let　us　take　an　example．1　can　do　anything　wi血
my　watch　as　its　possessor．　But　this　same　watch，　left　on　a　table，　can　devastate
your　entire　life　if　only　you　put　it　into　your”pocket”．　A　still　more　surprising
mystery　can　happen．　The　same　act　of　your　putting　the　same　watch　into　your
pocket　will　not　haml　you　at　all，　but　only　add　to　your　property，　only　if　you
heard　some　moments　befbre　the　action，　my　voice　saying”I　give　that　watch
to　you°1．　Let　us　share　Hume曹s　surprise　that　this　phenomenon　is　totally
incomprehensible　in　terms　of　natural　causation．　There　is　something　needed
to　fill　the　gap．5
Hume　constantly　appeals　to　the　principle　that　every　phenomenon　can　be
explained　as　a　causal　reaction．　The　rule　of　the　transfer　of　property　by
consent　emerges　in　continuation　to　the　mle　of　the　stability　of　possessions．
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、Hume　stipulates　five　rules　fbr　deciding　property．　The　central　principle，　a
criticism　of　the　Aristotelian　principle，　is　that　property　should　not　be　decided
based　on　any　desert　or　merit　of　the　person．　Though　this　b血gs　stability，　it　is
accompanied　by　an　inconvenience　that　the　resulting　de　facto　distribution　of
goods　is　too　much　dependent　on　chances，　which　must　cause　gross
inconveniences．　It　is　not　mtil　man　co面onts　this　inconvenience　that　man
血ids　some　way　of　modifying　the　initial　allocation　of　property．　It　is　wrong　to
suppose　that　people　demand　the　proper　distribution　of　things　befbre　finding
some　inconveniences　in　their　present　possession　of　property．　Properties
camot　be　kept　fixed　in　any　fbrm；the　needs　of　property　reflect　the　ever－
changing　situation　of　human　beillgs．　A”Remedy”to　this　inconvellience　is
sought　a負er．　Violence　is　the　worst　option．　The　next　strategy，　however，
commends　itself．　lt　reads：
possession　and　property　shou’d　always　be　st毎ble，　except　when血e　proprietor
agrees　to　bestow　them　on　some　other　person．　This　rule　can　have　no　ill
consequence，　in　occasioning　wars　and　dissentions；since　the　proprietofs
conse凪who　alone　is　concem’（ちis　taken　alone血the　ahenation：And　it　may
serve　to　many　good　purposes　in　a（加sting　properけto　persons．　Different
parts　of　eamh　produce　different　commodities；and　not　only　so，㎞t雌㎜t
men　bo出are　by　natUre　fitted　for　different卿lo購，　and　attain　tO脚
perfection　hl　any　one，　when　they　coniine　theniselves　to　it　alone．　All　this
requires　a　mu伽1　exchange　and◎omneroe；飴r　whch脚n血e　t㎜1曲n
of　prpperty　by　consent　is　f（）unded　on　a　law　of　natuπe，　as　well　as　its　stability
without　such　a　oonsent．（T　3．2．4．1）
　　This　is　the　second　law　of　justice　in　Hume．　In　this　way，　the　redistribution
of　property　at　once　explains　the　origin　of　commerce　and　the　division　of
labour．　Through　these，　property　can　most　effectively　be　redistributed　in
accordance　with　present　needs．　Hume　describes　・the　natUral　emergence　of　the
relevant　concept　regarding　the　redistribution　of　property．　Consent　is
established，　suited　to　its　size，　as　a　means　fbr　redistributi！1g　goods　based　on
individual　requirments．　It　serves　as　a　cause　fbr　people°s　property　to　circulate
in　society．　Consent　is　the　only　way　of　changing　once　fixed　property
relationship　and，　therefore，　the　most　convenient　way　of　redistribution．
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　　Most　significant　of　all，　consent”can　have　no　ill　consequence¢1（T　3．2．4．1），
because　consent　guarantees　the　peacefUl　redistribution　of　property　among
people．　However，　unm（e　Locke，　Humean　consent　is　not　the　primary　ground
ofjustice；its　fUnc廿on　is　confhled　to　the　distribution　of　property　based　on　the
needs　and　desires　of　individuals．　Moreover，　Humean　consent　differs　from
Lockean　consent　beca肌se　it　does　not　represent　the　natumal　right　prescribed　in
natulal　law．　In　other　words，　collsellt　is　valid　not　because　of　the　absolute
rights　of　individuals，　but　because　of　convention．　As　with　the　rule　fbr　the
stability　of　property，　consent　is　based　on　convention，　which　represents　its
validity　and　its　binding　f（）rce．
　　Hume　clearly　aims’to　replace　the　Lockean　term　of，lconsent”that
represents　the　right　of　individuals．6The　consent　of　the　individuals　is　a　social
means　fbr　a（加sting　property　ownership，　and　there　is　no　Lockean　inalienable
right　involved　in　consent．　Consent　is　based　on　the　convention　of　society
regarding　the　transference　of　property．　However，　consent　is　conferred　with　a
strong　moral　power　because　of　the　absolute　necessity　fbr　avoiding　conflict
and　sustaining　individual　life，　when　it　is　established　as　the　law　of　justice・
This　mle　is　absolute　because　the　redistribution　of　goods　is　impossible
without　this　nlle，　and　without　redistributio11，　society　would　not丘mction　at
all．
　　There　is　another　sense　in　which　the　second　law　of　justice　serves　to
produce　another　significallt　concept　fbr　the　fbrmation　of　society，　which　i＄
”mutualityl，．　In　the　first　law　of　the　stability　of　property，　property　emerges　as
the　result　of　each　person　concentrating　on　his　own　possessions．　At　this　stage，
the　nlle　of　justice　works　without　active　human　relationship・First　in　this
second　law　of　justice　hldividuals　enter　into　mutuality　through　the　exchange
of　1血e廿possessions，　as　distributors　of　their　property．　This　is　the　initial　sense
of　mutuality．　Thus，　illdividuals　are　involved　in　mutual　relationships　with
other　people　by　exchanging　their　property，　and　by　strengthening　mutual
dependency　and　social　order．　Consent　is　a　vehicle　fbr　producing　mutuality．
In血is　way，　Hume　has　radically　transformed　the　concept　of　consent丘om　the
Lockean　means　fbr　Iegitimatization　to　the　means　fbr　developing　human
relations．7This　fUrther　prepares　the　way　for　positing　the　last　law　of　justice，
promise－keepi119．’
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4・Promise　as　t血e　Completion　of　tbe　Lavvs　of　Justice
　　The　third　law　ofjustice，　the　performance　of　promise，　is　fbunded　upon　the
second　law，　transference　by　consent．　In　order　to　demonstrate　its　artificiality，
Hume　resorts　an　argument　similar　to　that血his　discussion　of　the　stability　of
possessions．　If　promise　is　shown．to　be　based　on　convention，　it　no　longer　can
be　the　ultimate　justification　of　govemment．　Hume　points　out　why　keeping
promises　is　an　artificial　virtue．　He　asserts
that　a　promise　is　not　intelligible　naturally，　nor　antecedent　to　human
conventions；孤d肋t　a㎜，㎜qu翻舳society，　coUld　never　enter
into　any　engagements　with　another，　even　thog　they　could　perceive　each
othei’s血oughts　by血加薩don．（T　3．2．5．2）
　　】日【ume　conf㎞s　the　above　passage　by　asserthlg　that　there　is　no”faculty　of
sou1”that　produces　promise．　Though　promise　is　issued　by　the　agent　to
commit　himself　to　a　fUture　action，　neither”resolution’，，　nor　lldesirel曾，　nor
ll翌奄撃撃奄撃撃〟hassigns　him　any　obligation．　This　is　the　fundamental　point　of
Hume，s　theory　of　promise．　Supporting　this　argumellt　lies　his　theory　of
causation：no　present　perception　guarantees　a負lture　event．　L遜（ewise，　no　one
can　produce　a　moral　relation　as　promise　by　himself．　Thus　it　is　arguable　that
Hume，s　theory　ofpromise　is　elucidated　by　the　same　argument　that　he　used　to
explain　causation．　The　core　argument　of　Hume，s　theory　of　promise　is　to
explain　how　it　is　that　the　present　contract　is　causally　connected　With　fUtUre
action．　Hume　recognizes　the　defect　of　the　social　colltract　theory　in　this
respect．　Thus　it　is　now　clear　that　the　real　purport　of　Hume，s　theory　of
causation　is　a　criticism　of　the　social　contract　theory．　This　is　related　to　the
basic　tenet　ofhis　moral　perception．　According　to　Hume，
A皿morality　dependS　upOn　our　sentirnentS；and　when　any　action，　or　quality
of　the　minq　pleases　us　afier　a　certain　manner，　we　say　it　is　vi血lous；and
when　the　neglect，　or　non－perfbrmance　of　it，　displeases　us　after　a　like
manner，　we　say　that　we　he　under　all　obHgation　to　perfbrm　it．．．．［We　cannot］
render　any　action　agreeable　or　disagreeable，　moral　or　immoral；which，
Without　that　act，　wou「d　have　produced　contrary㎞pressions，　or　have　been
㎝dowl醐㎞t　q蝋es．σ3．2．5．4）
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　　Hume　clarifies　the　mysterious　character　of　promise．　Promise　is　like　a
magical　formula　that　changes　people’s　behaviour．　Hume　emphasises　that　as
it　cannot　possibly　be　created　by　any　working　of　the　mind　of　a　single　person，
it　must　be　derived丘om　something　beyolld　the　individual　will．　Shown　in　his
explanation　of　the　stability　of　property，　there　must　be　a　natural　motivation
fbr　all　action　to　become　a　moral　obligation；in　the　case　of　natural　vi血es，
moral　norms　are　derived　from　pleasant　or　usefU1　tendencies　of　human　action
that　are　established　as　a　custom．　H㎜e敏es血e　examples　of　relieving　the
miserable，　and　of　a　father　taking　care　of　his　childre11（Cf　T　3．2．1．5）．　For
those　moral　obligations，　there　are　corresponding　naturahnclillations　that
urge　us　to　take　some　action　whose　negligence　means　a　deficit　of　natural
sentiments　of　humanity．8　Unlike　these　natural　virtues　that　are　accompanied
by　a　natUra1　inclination，　however，
there　is　mat皿any　no　inclination　to　obse1ve　promises，　disti　ICt　ftOm　a　s㎝nse　of
the廿obligadon；it　fbnows，　that　fidehty　is　llo　natural　v廿tue，　and　that　pmmises
have　no　fbrce，　antecedent　tO　hurnan　conventions．（T　3．2．5．6）
　　This　is　the　evidence　fbr　the　artificiality　of　the　third　law　of　justice；
”promises　are　h㎜鋤inventions，　founded　on血e　necessities　and　interestS　of
society”（T　3．2．5．7）．　As　a　promise　cannot　exist　without　other　laws　ofjustice，
it　cannot　be　the　original　fbundation　of　society．　Independent　individuals
cannot　resort　to　the　system　of　promise　in　order　to　fbrm　a　society．　In　this　way，
Hume　denies　the　fimction　of　promise　in　establishing　a　politica1　society．　But
this　negative　argumellt　is　fbllowed　by　a　positive　theory　about　promise．
Hume　fUlly　acknowledges　the　essential　fUnction　of　promise　in　society．　It　is
important　to　understand　how　promise　fbllows　the　first　two　mles　of　justice．
By　the　first　law　of　justice，　Hume　explained止e　stability　of　society　an舳e
creation　of　property．　This　is　a　fbundation　fbr　creating　independent
individuals　who　work　on　their　own　with　a　favourable　indifference　to　others．
But　this　is　not　enough　fbr　their　survival，　and　they　establish　the　second　law　of
nature　to　transfbr　each　otherls　property　by　consent，　which　is　the　first　step
toward　the　mutual　commitment　of　the　individuals．　The　transfbrence　of
property，　however，　tums　out　not　to　be　enough　fbr　implementing　mutual
49
　　　　　　　のcooperatlon．
The〃αη⑫7θηcθof　property，　which　is　the　proper　remedy　fbr　this
hlconvenience，　cannot　remedy　it　en撫｝ly；because　it　can　on】y　take　place　with
legald　to　such（珂ects　as　ale、presen’and’励磁麗α1，　but　not　to　such　as　ale
absent　or　general．（T　3．2．5．8）
　　Though　transference　of　property　by　consent　is　known　to　be　to　mutUal
advantage，　it　is　not　always　easy　to　practice，　mostly　because　of　physical
limitations．　Distant　property，1ike”a　particular　house，　twellty　leagues
distεmt”，　or　a　general　thing，　like”ten　bushels　of　com”，　cannot　be　transferred．
More　serious　cases，　however，　apply　to”services　and　actions，　which　we　may
exchange　to　our　mutUal　interest　and　advantage”（T　3．2．5．8）．　Hume　describes
the　quandary　in　a　supefbly　succinct　manner：
Now　as　it飴quently　h叩1玲ns，　that止ese　mutual帥㎜mces　camot　be
finish’d　at　the　same　instance，’廿s　necessaly，止at　one　party　be　contented　to
remain　in　uncer㎞ty，　and　dePend　upon　the　gratitUde　of　the　other　for　a　retUrn
of㎞dness．　But　so　much　corruption　is　there　among　men，甑，　generally
蜘kipg，血is　be◎omes　but　a　slender　security；and　as　the　benef…rctor　is　here
suppos曾d　to　bestow　his　favours　With　a　View　tO　self－interest，　this　both　takes　off
from　the　obligatioq　and　sets　an　example　of　selfislmess，　which　is　the　tme
mother　of　ingratitUde．　Were　we，　therefore，　to　fbllow　the　na血圃coulse　of　our
passions　and　inclinations，　we　shou曾d　perfbrm　but　few　actions　fbr　the
advantage　of　others，丘om　disillte1ested　views；because　we　are　naturally　very
lirnited血our㎞（h鰯and血don：And　we　shou°d　I舳㎜醜w　of血t
kind，　out　of　a　regard　to　interest；because　we　canllot　depend　upon　their
grati加de．　Here　then　is　the　mutual　commerce　of　good　o伍ces血a　manner　lost
among　mank㎞（町and　every　one　leducld　to　his　own　skill　and血dustry　fbr　his
weH－behlg　and　subsisten㏄．（T　3．25．8）
　　Hume　is　aware　that　people　will　not　often　consent　to　sacrifice　their
personal　interest　fbr　the　sake　of　others　or　the　public　at　large．　It　is　easy　to　see
that　Hume　has　in　mind山e　Hobbesian　quan｛助of　being皿able　to　rely　on
others，　gratitude　or　voluntary　kindness　fbr　mutuahnterest．9　As　everyone
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loves　himself　more　than　others，　kindness　to　others　is　naturally　overwhelmed
by　selfLinterest．　Thus，　it　is　contradictory　to　human　nature　to　rely　on　the
voluntary　kindlless　of　others　to　attain　one，s　own　self」interest，　though　mutual
cooperation　is　necessary　fbr　selfLinterest．　The　latter　is　desired　from　the
gelleral　point　of　view．　The　solution　to　the　problem　is　to　secure　cooperation
by　the　sanction　of　self」interest：by　using　a　certain｛brm　of　words，　a　man
”subj　ects　himself　to　the　penalty　of　never　being　trusted　again　in　case　of
血ilure”（T　3．2．5．10）．　This　is　the　initiation　of　the　moral　system　of　promise．　In
this　way，　people　make　use　of　promise，　which　allows　us　to　act　relying　on　the
will　of　others，　sanctioned　by　the　whole　spectrum　of　morality丘om　legal
systems　to　a　mere　dislike．
　　Unlike　the　Hobbesian　quandary　of　complete　isolation，　people　have
already　attained　the　cnlcial　first　two　steps　ofjustice．　The　last　problem　is　how
to　extend　the　positive　act　of　mutuality　that　brings　such　a　huge　benefit　to　each
by　their　non－simultaneous　cooperation，　or　by　cooperation　that　is　not　based
on　present　perceptions．　Promise　is　an　artificial　assurance　to　bind　the　fUture
action　of　a　persol1，　which　is　by　definition　beyond　the　reach　of　any　other
person．　As　in　the　first　and　the　secolld　law　of　justice，　the　nlle　of　keeping
promise　is　fbunded　on　convention．　At　this　stage，　it　is　not　difficult　for　people
to　perform　the　promise，　because血ey　have　already　acquired　the五rst　and　the
second　laws　ofjustice　of　attainillg　self－interest　through　mutuality・
Performing　promises　assumes　a　stronger　moral　force　in　accordance　with　its
utility　fbr　the　interest　of　society．　The　rule　of　keeping　promises　develops　from
the　second　rule　of　the　transference　of　property；it　is　a　transference　of　fUture
action　by　consent．　If　the　first　and　the　second　law　of　justice　are　concemed
with　the　spatial　distribution　of　human　goods，　the　third　law　of　justice　is
concemed　wi舳e　temporal　dis励ution　of　human　goods　that　include　fUture
behaviour．　Hume，s　explanation　demands　no　impracticable　pe面㎜ance　like
the　Hobbesian　renouncement　of　rights．　Like　other　laws　ofjustice，　promise　is
away　to　achieve　stable　self」interest　in　a　cooperative　scheme，　i．e．　relying　on
the　fUture　behaviour　of　other　people．　Because　the　morality　of　promise　is
based　on　interest　in　self　as　well　as　others，　it　can　easily　prevaiL　Then
perfbmling　Promise　becomes　a　strong　obligation，　as　it　is　natural　to”every
mortal”（T　3．25．11）．
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A皿they［moralistS　and　pOliticians］can　pretend　tt），　is，　tO　give　a　new　direction
飯｝those　natUral　passions，　and　teach　us　that　we　can　bet塾er　satisfシour　appetites
血an　obhque　and　artificial　malmer，　than　by　their　headlong　and　impet皿ous
㎜廿on・Hence　I　learn　to　do　a　serVice　tO　another，舳o顧伽血g　him　any
re烈㎞（lness；because　1　forsee，　that　he　Will　return　my　service，血expectation
of　another　of　the　same　kind，　and　in　order　to　maintain　the　same
correspOndence　ofgood　o伍ces　with　me　or　with　o血ers．（T　3．2．5．9）
　　Hume　points　out　another　important　featUre　of　promise；the　validity　of
promise　does　not　depend　on　the　hidden　hltention　of　the　promiser；even　if　the
promiser　has”an　intention　of　deceiving　us”，　we　are　still”bound　by　his
expression　or　vefbal　promise，　if　we　accept　it，1（T　3．2．5．13）．　This　is　concemed
with　the　ultimate　authority　of　promise．　It　is　significant　to　llotice　that　this　is
understood　as　Hume’s　phenomenalism　of　morality　which　is　a　criticism　of　the
Lockean　concept　of　person　as　a　moral　substance　whose，lintention”endorses
the　promise．10　Promise　depends　only　on　a　formal　feature　of　wording．　This　is
why　promise　can　share　public　validity，　as　in　making　a　private　will　public．
Therefbre，　it　is　possible　to　understand　that　Hume　replaces　the　moral
intention　of　the　person　with　public　endorsement，　as　the　ground　of　morality
and　the　validity　of　promise．　Promise　assumes　a　force　not　because　of　the　will
of　the　promiser，　but　owning　to　the　convention　publicly　established．　Through
promise，　a　new　type　of　human　causation　is　introduced；our　personal
intention　regarding　our　fUture　actions，　expressed　in　promise，　are　assumed　to
be　quasi－reality．　In　fact，　as　Hume　establishes　in　his　theory　of　extemal
o切ects，　this　signifies　the　human　meaning　of”realiげ．
　　Hume　thus　treats　promise　as　causation．11正ike　the　other　two　nlles　of
justice，　promise　is　an　artificial　causation　that　exerts　the　same　power　in　the
way　as　physical　objects　caμse　human　behaviour．　A　promise，　though　it　is
physically　a　mere”voice”or”ink”，　exerts　causal　power　by　producing　certahl
beliefs　in　the　people　concerned．　Promises　move　people　thropgh　their　belief
that　breach　of　pro血se　will　cause　sanction．　Promisees　have　to　arrange　their
血ture　behaviour　on　the　condition，　expressed　by　the　promisers．　The　words　of
the　promiser血mction　just　like　any　other　belief　in　physical　reality．　Promises
set　the　framework　fbr　peoplels　behaviour．　Just　as　we　walk　on　solid　grou血d
and　avoid，cliffs，　we　plan　our　fUture　behaviour　taking　the　events　predicted　by
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promise　as　quasi－reality．　The　artificial　causation　of　promises　is　no　diffbrent
from　the　natural　causation　of　obj　ects　because　bo血influence　human　beings
through　their　beliefs．　Promise－breaking　infhinges　upon　all　behaviours　within
the　framework　ofjustice．　Hume　compares　promise　to”transubstantiatioがor
”holy　orders”（T　3．2．5．14）impressed　that　what　is　no　more　than　l，being　mere
sound”（T　3．2．5．14），　the　vibration　of　the　air，　exerts　such　a　physical　fbrce．12
Unlike　the　Lockean　idea，　the　moral　power　of　promise　does　not　derive　its
authority　from，，heaven”．　Promise　is　a　clear，　non－mysterious　prediction　of
血血re　behaviour　of　other　people．　Besides　1血at，　each　party　has　tlleir　liberty　to
serve　his　own　interest　on　the　assumption　of　the　promise．　In　this　way，　people
begin　to　make　many　arrangements　to　meet　the　new　situation　and　to　increase
individual　interests．
　　Once　the　obligation　to　keep　promises　is　established　as　a　promise　of
justice，　it　exerts　a　dramatically　expanding　fbrce　in　society　fbr　producing　new
relatiolls．　This　fbrmative　power　of　promise　has　to　do　with　its　fbrmality。　As
the　law　ofjustice　is　restricted　to　performing　promises，　promises　can　be　made
regardless　of　their　content　abOut　whatever　arrangement　tWo　parties　are　ready
to　consent　to．　Perfbming　promises　is　the　final　development　of　the　laws　of
justice　in　that　it　can　stipulate　any　law　including　the　first　law　of　non－violation
of　other，s　possessions．　In　this　sense，　promises　accomplish　the　first　and
second　laws　of　justice．　This　has　led　the　theorists　of　the　social　contract　to　be
deceived　that　promise　is　the　first　law　of　justice　rather　than　a　subsequellt，
emergent　law．　Such　is　the　convenience　and　power　of　promises　that
eventually　people　organise　every　social　arrangemellt　through　promises　as　a
system　of　law．
　　Once　human　activities　start　to　be　carried　out　through　the　system　of
promise，　it　is　impossibIe　to　get　rid　of　the　system；the　contents　of　the　nlle　can
be　changed　but　the　mamer　of　acting　by　such　nlles　cannot　be　oわliterated
other　than　at　the　cost　of　complete　social　disintegration．　As　with　the　most
血mdamental　conventions　like　language，　keeping　promises　is　sine　qua　non
for　sustaining　society．　Hume　says　that”it　is　impossible　for　men　so　much　as
to　murder　each　other　without　statues，　and　maxims，　and　an　idea　ofjustice　and
honour”（EPM　4．20）13．This　reflects　the釦ndamentally　conventional　nature
of　human　behaviour．
　　Just　as　it　is　in　llthe　selfis㎞ess　and　confined　generosity　of　men　and　the
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scarce　provision　natUre　has　made　fりr　his　wants”that　justice　derives　its
origin，　so　the　origin　of　promise　derives　from　the　desire　fbr　compensating
insuf丘cient　property　With　the　combined　effect　of　selfishness　and　the　1imited
generosily．　These　inconveniences　are　set　by　nature．　But　they　can　bring
invaluable　pleasure　and　infinite　wealth　to　human　society　in　the　end．　Thus
Hume’s　theory　of　justice　explains　the　basic　structure　of　social　order　in　the
fU11　shape　of　both　its　sρatia1　and　temporal　dimensions．
5．The　Origin　of　the　Government　as　the　Perfection　of　Justice
Hume’s　account　of　the　establisiment　of　government　is　founded　on　his
theo】ry　of　justice．　A　central　characteristic　of　Hume’s　theory　of　justice　is　that
Hume　separates　the　origin　ofjustice　from　morality．　Society　without
govemment　is　logically　possible　because　convention　is　more　fUndamental　as
the　bond　of　society　than　govemment．　However，　this　does　not　of　course　mean
that　government　is　red皿dant．　Hume曾s　task　is　to　explain　the　emergence　of
govemment．　On　the　other　hand，　Hume　clearly　holds　that　government　is
impossible　without　society．　In　this　respect，　Hume　denies　the　Hobbesian
theory　in　favour　of　the　Lockean　theory　about　govemment．　Locke　considers
血at　government．compensates　for　the　imperfection　of　human　beings；because
of　imperfection，　human　beings　sometimes　fail　to　realise血e　prescription　of
natural　law．　Thus，　according　to　Locke，　there　are　fbur　maj　or　tasks　of　the
govemment：to　enact　Iaws，　to　judge　cases，　to　administrate　the　law　and
judgement，　and　to　deal　with　foreign　affairs．
While　Locke　recognises　the　origin　of　government血the　imperfection　of
human　be血gs，　Hume　does　not　take　the　moral　weakness　of　human　beings　as
imperf6ction．　It　rightly　represents　the　actual　mechanism　of　human
psychology，”that　men　are　mightily　govern，d　by　the　imagination，　and
proportion　their　affections　more　to　the　light，　under　which　any　object　appears
to　them，　than　to　its　real　and　intrinsic　value”（T　3．2．7．1）．　Even　though　the
system　ofjustice　is　known　to　procure　the　general　interest，　justice　requires　the
renouncement　of　one’s　direct　pursuit　of　self－interest．　On　the　other’　hand，　the
benefit　by　breaching　justice　is　specific　and　particular．　Although　the
particular　bellefit　is　much　smaller　than　the　general　interest，　it　has　a　more
vivid　influence　on　individual　behaviour．
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This　is　the　reason　why　men　so　o食en　act　in　contradic廿on　to　the廿㎞own
interest；and　in　particular　why　they　prefer　any　trivial　advantage，　that　is
presenち　tO　the　maintenance　of　order　in　society，　which　so　much　depends　on
血eobservance　ofjusd㏄．　The　oonsequences　of　every　breach　of　equi呼seem
to　lie　very　remote，　and　are　not　able　to　counter－bala’nce　any　immediate
advantage，　that　may　be　reap曾d　tfOm　it．（T　3．2．7．3）
　　Because　of　the　weakness　of　human　beings，　they　tend　to　choose　the
particular，　but　smaller　interest　rather　than　justice．“You　have　the　same
propension，　that　I　have，　in　favour　of　what　is　contiguous　above　what　is
remote”（T　3．2．7．3）．　The　imitative　tendency　of　human　nature　provides　a
fi」耐her　reason　to　breach　justice，　because　to　abide　by　justice　among　other
people　igno血g　it　makes　us，，the　cully　of［their】integrity”（ibid．）．珂ustice　is
wrong　not　because　it　is　contradictory，　as　in　Kant，　but　because　it　destroys　the
fabric　of　convention　and　causes　dysfUnction　to　the　system　of　justice．
However，　Hume　asserts　that　the　weaklless　holds　at　the　same　time　the
rem亭dy，　because
When　we　consider　any　objects　at　a　distance，　all　their　minute　distinctions
vanish，　and　we翻s　give　the　preference　to　whatever　is　in　itSelf　preferable，
Without◎onside血ig　itS　situation　and　circumstances．．．My　distance　from　the
final　detemlillation　makes　all　those　minute　difference　vanish，　nor　am　I
affected　by　any曲g，　but出e　g㈹al　and　more　discemable　qualities　of　good
and　evi1．（T　3．2．7．5）
　　It　is　evident　that　this　explanation　implies　the　general　point　of　view　as　a
means　for　seekng　for　what　is　preferable　in　itself，　correcting　our　immediate
judgements．　Therefbre，　justice　is　reflected　in　the　general　point　of　view・As
we　have　seen，　justice　is　involved　in　coordinating　the　interests　of　the
individuals．　Justice　wil1110t　perish，　even　if　it　contradicts　individual　interest，
as　long　as　people　deal　with血eir　interest　in　sustainable　human　relationships．
Hume’s　moral　principle　identifies　a　concrete　mea血s　to　realise　it．　Therefbre，
the　requirement　of　justice　clarifies　a　concrete　procedure　fbr　securing　its
observatio11．　Thus　Hume丘nds　the　origin　of　govemment　in　the　compensation
of　individual　morality．　As　the　initial　incident　for　establishing　government，
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Hume　cites　”quarrels＿among　different　societies”（T　3．2．8．1）．　In　conflicts
with　other　societies，　society　in　warfare　lleeds　a　specific　leader　who
a血inistrates　justice，　o血erwise　the　society　will　imniediately　collapse．　i4　The
qualification　of　the　administrator　does　not　matter　compared　to　his　role　of
perceiving　the　observance　ofjustice　as　in　his　own　interests．
These㎝e騨ns，　whom　we　call　ciVi1　magistrates，㎞騨md励血sters，
our　governors　and　niers，　who　l舳9舳㎞t　I兇欝ons舳e騨加st脚
of血e　s㈱，　have　no血箆resちor　b皿a㎜o斡one，血㎝y㏄t　of恥dce；and
being　satisfied　with　theh°present　conditio4　and　with　the廿part血s㏄iety，
have　all　immediate　interest　in　every　execution　of　justice，　which　is　so
necessary　to　the　upholding　of　society．　Here　then　is　the　origin　of　civil
govemlnent　alld　anegiance．（T　3．2．7．6）
　　Government，　once　established，　assumes　the　authority　of　settlillg　all
disputes　about　justice．　ne　bene且t　of　gove㎜ent　reaches蝕he曲an・that．
Governments，　by　all　means，”fbrce　them［people］to　seek　their　own
adva漁ge，　by　a　concurrence　in　some　common　end　or　purpose”（T　3．2．7．8）．
The　activities　of　govermment　achieve　the　cooperation　ofpeople．　Government
has　the『physical　capacity　of　enabling　People　to　engage　in　johlt　prql　ects　with
amultitude　of　others．　The　system　of　promise　can　have　two　neighbours
”agree　to　drain　a　meadow”（ibid．）．　But　promise　cannot　have　a　thousand
people　concert　and　execute　so　complicated　a　design，　because鴨each　seeks　a
pretext　to　fヒee　himself　of　the　trouble　and　expense，　and　would　lay　the　whole
burden　on　others”（’わid．）．　Govemment　extends　the　positive　function　of
promise　by　representing　the　multitudes　of　people．　Therefbre，　only
government　embodies　the　general　point　of　view　and　morality　in　its　entire
scale．
Thus　bridges　are　built；harbours　opend’d；ramparts　rais’d；canals　form’d；
且eets　equip，d；and　armies　disciplin’d；every　where，　by　the　care　of
gov㎜甑w㎞ch血o’compOs’d　of　men　sUbject　to　all　human　infimiities，
becomes，　by　one　of　the　finest　and　most　subtle　inventions　imaghlable，　a
compOsition，　that　is，　in　some　measure，　exempted　ftOm　all　these　in丘㎜ities．
（T3．2．7．8）
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　　In　this　way，　Hume　explains　the　establishment　of　govemment　without
reso丘ing　to　the　concept　of　co甜act．　Unlike血e　govemment　prescribed　by
Hobbes　and　Locke，　Humean　govemment　is　thought　to　produce　unlrnown
public　interests．　It　is　cnlcial　to　notice　that　though　the　products　of　those
interests　are　all　perceivable，　government　itself　as　the　cause　of　these伽gible
interests　is　not　at　all　directly　perceivable．15　There　is　no　such　substance　as
govemment．　Hume　calls　govemment”one　of　the　finest　and　most　subtle
inventions，　imag血able，　a　compositionll（T　3．2．7．8）．　Government　exists　only
as　a”食mction”：something　that　embodies　justice　that　consists　in　the　general
interest．　In　this　sense，　the　principle　of　govemment　is　the　general　point　of
view．　Humean　government　is　es励lished　as　the　development　of血e　system
of　justice；it　is　required　to　sanction　the　system　of　justice．　Unlike　Hobbes，
government　does　not鶴ularly　aim　to　protect　the　life　of　people，　and　unlike
Locke，　it　does　not　particularly　aim　to　protect　the　property　of　people．　Humean
govemment　realises　stability　and　promotes　the血terest　of　society　that，　more
concretely，　is　power，　ability，　and　security．
As　Hume’s　theory　of　govemment　is　not　founded　on　any　contract，　it　has　a
different　obj　ective丘om　the　contractarian　theories．　Hume’s　govemment　is
established　as　the　natural　development　of　convention　and　has　a　role　in
sustai血9　the　order　prescribed　by　the　system　ofjustiCe．　Hume　also　gives　a
different　explanation　regarding　the　rules　to　decide　forms　of　government．
Justice　regarding　the　stability　of　property　claims　nothing　about　who　should
own　what．　The　central　point　of　the　concept　of　justice　is　that　property　does
not　exist　as　an　inherent　quality　of　objects．　This　is　a　result　of　Humels
scepticism　about　the　essence　of　property；there　is　no　quality　in　obj　ects　that
commends　itself　as　the　property　of　any　specific　possessor．　Ownership　by
specific　persons　is　decided　only　by　convention．　It　is　significant　that　the　same
theo聯plies　to　the　establistment　of　govemment．16
　　Hume　asserts　that”［a］s　numerous　and　civiliz曾d　society　camot　subsist
without　govemment，　so　govemment　is　entirely　useless　without　an　exact
obedience，，（T　3．2．10．1）．　The　point　is　that　strict　obedience　is　due　not　to　any
inherent　quality　of　the　govemment．　Obedience　is　solely　a　matter　of　the
atti加de　of血e　citizens．　Govemment　formally　requires　compliance，　but　it　is
血epeople　who　realise　it。　And　it　is　H㎜e’s㎞damenml血eory　that　justice
57
lies　in　this　obedience　rather　than　in　government．　It　does　not　ma枕er　who
govems，　because　people　submit　themselves　not　to　the　sovereign　but　to　the
system　of　justice・On　the　contrary，　it　is　the　worst　political　system　to　rely　on
the　personal　capacity　of　the　political　authority，　precisely　because　it
represents　only　his画cul訂po㎞t　of　view．171n血is　way，　Hume　pres励es　a
theory　of　government　based　on　the皿le　of　law．18
　　1t　is　very　important　to　understand　Hume，s　theory　of　govemment　in
analogy　to　the　theory　of　the　existellce　of　extemal　bodies．　In　his　theory　of　the
existence　of　external　bodies，　Hume　shows　that　external　bodies　are　a
requirement　fbr　the　perceptions　of　causation－一一that　multiple　perceptions　are
reduced　to　the　qualities　of　one　obj　ect　as　their　common　source．　In出e　same
sense，　laws　ofjustice，　as　they　in　fact　arise血om　convention，　are　in
themselves　unstable．　When　disputes　occur，　they　are　easily　broken　or
neglected．　In　order，　therefbre，　to　render　them　more　solid，　they　are　ascribed　to
one”substance”that　supposedly　issues　the　laws，　and　has　the　authority　to
㎞plement血em．　This　is　the　govemment，　as　human血vention．
　　The　creation　of　govemment　derives　from　the　convention　of　people　in
general，　a血d　not丘om　the　personal　behaviour　of　the　govemor．　Therefbre，　the
principle　fbr　deciding　a　govemor　is　that　it　should　be　in　accordance　with
convention　as　the　natural　embodiment　of　human　nature．　Hume，s　rules　fbr
explaining血e　au血ority　of　governments　are　five　in　number：long　Possession
or四垂窒?唐モ窒奄垂狽奄盾氏求求C　present　possession，　conquest　as　the　analogue　of
”occupation”，　succession，　and　positive　laws　which　derive　their　fbrce　fヒom
some　of　those　principles．19　Just　as　in　the　case　of　the　rules　of　property，　these
rules　are　all　based　on　the　psychological　sense　of　attachment．
　　However，　Hume　by　no　means　thinks　that　these　rules　confer　strict
legitimacy　to　any　govemment．　As　evidence　for　this，　he　approves　the　right　of
resisting　govemment．20　The　point　is血at　Hume　is　conv血ced　that　the　essence
of　government　does　not　lie　in　the　initial　determination　of　the　object　of
allegiance．　The　social　contract　theory　mistakes　the　contract　with　the
magistrate　fbr　the　obligation　of　obedience．　It　is　one　thing　to　decide　the　agent
who　personifies　gove］mment　and　it　is　another　to　ascribe　an　authority　to
govemment．　To　decide　an　agent　is　a　minor　task　compared　to　ascribing
authority　to　government　itself，　because　the　former　does　not　make　sense
without　the　latter．　Hume　clarified　that　governmental　function　of
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administrating　justice　in　fact　depends　on　the　allegiance　of　people・The
ultimate　significance　of　the　virtue　of　obedience　is　not　influenced　by　the
choice　of　magistrate　or　the　fbnn　of　govemance．　The　real　danger　lies　in　the
contrary　claims　fbr　the　alleged”best”political　regime　21．
6．A皿egiance　to伽Government
　　The　central　characteristic　of　Hume’s　theory　of　govemment　is　that　he
employs　a　Copernican　tum　to　clarifソthe　nature　of　govemment．　Hume
clarifies　that　the　essellce　of　wel1－fUnctioning　govemment　consists　in　the
sponta皿eous　obedience　of　the　people，　rather　than　the　fbrce　of　the　sovereign
or　promises　of　allegiance．　This　is　a　tum　from　a　substance－centred　to　a
relation－centred　perspective．　P．　F．　Brownsey　alleges　that　Hume　does　not
succeed　in　providing　legitimate　grounds　for　obeying　government．　He　obj　ects
that　Hume　does　not　provide　any　explanation　of　legitimate　political　authority．
He　claims：
Now認a皿e　H㎜e　p㎜n醐s面li㎞Im㎎】ment　as　a　non℃ontractarian
way　of　establishing　a　mora1　obligation　to　obey　govemment．　Even　if出e
arg㎜ent　su㏄eeds血pmviding　non－contractarian　gmunds　f（）r　the　obligation
めobey，　it　does　not　by肱耽t　d㎝om甑e　a　non－contractarian　source　of
rightfU1　POlitica1　authority．　And　it　does　not　refUte　the　clahn　of　contmct　theory
血at　govemmentS　can　acquire　rightfu1　a曲晦only血co脚ence　of　a
S㏄ial　COntraCt．22
Because　Hume　explains山e　establishment　of　government　in　a　naturalistic
way，　he　presents　a　non－contractarian　theory　for　explaining　the　legitimacy　of
the　govemment．　It　is　important　to　notice血at　Hume’s　theory　about　obedience
to　govemment　is　supervened　by　his　theory　of　justice・Hume丘nds血at　the
role　of　gove㎜ent　is　to臨charge　of血e　execution　ofjustice・If　the　role　of
government　is　to　compel　people　to　observe　the　laws　of　justice，　govemment
cannot　be　sustained　by　promise．　Therefbre，　Hume　supposes　a　different
principle　than　promise　fbr　producing　obedience．　Thus，　Hume　recognises
”allegiance”as　a　distinctive　vi血e．　Hume面nks　that　allegiance　is　initially
gra丘ed　to　the　duty　of　promise，　but　in　due　course　it　obtains　an　original　duty
an伽血o靭independent　of　the　pro血ssory　contract．　Hume　explains　that：
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having　found　that　natural，　as　well　as　civi1　justice，　derives　itS　orign　from
human　convcntions，　we　s㎞n⑫cMy瓢eive，　how舳tless　it　is　to　resolve
the　one　h1敢）other，　and　see】～hl　the　laws　of　natule，　a　stmnger　f（）undadon　fbr
our　pOlitical　duties　than　interesちand　human　conventions；while　these　laws
themselves　are　bUilt　on　the　very　same　foundation．　On　which－ever　side　we
㎞面ss呵ecちwe　s囲風伽止ese㈱㎞ds　of的are　exactly　on血e
same　fb《）t血9，　and　have　the　salne　source　both　of　the廿プ宏rst’ηvθηガoπand
moral　oわ1’gα加η．　They　are　contriv’d　to　remedy　like　hlconveniences，　and
㏄q血e励mOml㎜CdOn㎞血e　S㎜e㎜1d，加m血e廿㎜e帥9血OSe
inconveni㎝ces．（T　3．2．8．4）
　　As　we　have　seen，　govemment　not　only　compensates　fbr　the　moral
weakness　of　people　but　perfects　the　system　ofjustice．　Therefbre，　the　steady
observance　of　promise　is　an　effect　of　the　institUtion　of　government；but　that
the　obedience　to　govemment　is　not　an　effect　of　the　obligation　of　a　promise．
H㎜e曾s血ndamental　view　is止at　allegiance　is　what　makes　up　the　essence　of
government，　rather　than　govemment　producing　allegiance．　By　observing　the
mutual’interest　in　govemment，　the　convention　of　obeying　govemment　is
formed，　and　people　ascribe　moral　authority　to　govemment．　The　autho吻
becomes　stronger　as　people°s　interests　are　served　through　the　system　of
Justlce．
　　Humels　theory　of　govemment　is　conceived　in　parallel　to　his　theory　of
belief　in　the　existence　of　objects．　He　shows　that　the　most　certain　belief
provided　by　nature　is　the　belief　in　an　external　obj　ect．　Though　it　is　in　fact　a
fiction，　we　obtain　eno皿ous　advantage　and丘eedom　by　behaving　according
to　the　belief　in　extemal　bodies．23　in　a　similar　manner，　belief　in　govemment，
血ough　it　is　a　human　”composition”or”invention雪曽，　provides　people　wi舳e
advantage　and　fピeedom　that　only　a　society　and　a　system　of　justice　can
provide．．Govemment　is　not　a　substance　nor　does　it　exist　by　itself，　but　is　a
product　of　human　convention．　In　this　way，　Hobbes°s　theory　that　the
”Leviathan”is　a　composition　of　subj　ects　has　been　converted　into　Hume，s
theory　of　perception；govemment　is　composed　not　by　gathe血g　people，s
rights，　but　as　an　object　that　is　supPosed　to　exist　by　virtue　of　allegiance．
Humean　obedience　can　be　spontaneous　because　it　is　based　on　self　interest，
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which　naturally　contradicts　the　possibility　of　despotic　government．　As　Hume
says，”a　man　living　under　an　absolute　government，　wou，d　owe　it　no
allegiance；sjnce，　by　its　very　na加re，　it　depends　not　on　consent，°（T　3．2．8．9）．
Thus，　to　the　degree　that　the　general　po量nt　of　view　represents　the　public　and
establishes　and　maintains血e　govemment，　Hume曾s　argument　of　govemment
provides　the　empiricist　idea　of　democratisation　as　the　identificatioll　of　the
prillciple　of　govemance　with　the　represelltation　of　the　govemed．24
　　Now　it　is　possible　to　answer　Brownsey，s　criticism　that　Hume　does　not
explain　legitimate　political　authority．　Hume　denies　the　idea　that　obediellce　is
based　on　any　justi丘cation．　As　with　the　explanation　of　right，　Hume　would　say
血at　it　is　incorrect　to　talk　ofjustification　before　establishing　govemment．　The
idea　of　the　justification　of　govemment　implies　a　rej　ection　of　govemment
when　it　cannot　be　justified．　But　it　is　impossible　to　choose　a　judge，　outside
the　established　system　of　justice，　who　is　authorised　to　amounce　the　final
verdict　against　government．　Thus，　allegiance　is　not　based　on　any
justi丘cation．　Government　has　its　root　in　human　conventions　that　existS　prior
to　justification．　Though　it　is　possible　to　change　the　fbrm　a皿d　agency　of
government，　allegiance　to　govemment　as　such　must　remain　if　society　is　to
血nction　through　a　system　ofjustice．
7．The】遙ght　to　Resist
　　The　theory　of　allegiallce　reveals　the　understanding　that　underlies　Hume曾s
theory　of　the　right　to　resist．　Most㎞damentally，　the　right　to　resist　is　not　a
topic　that　can　positively　be血cluded　in　the　theory　of　govemment，　because
there　is　no　foundation　in　the丘amework　of　government　to　support　the　right
to　resist．　Hume　like　Hobbes，　aims　to　present　a　theory　that　will　discourage
resistence　from　happening．　This　is　possible　because　govemment　is　not　the
starting　point　of　his　theory　of　society．　Hobbes　strongly　argues　against　the
right　to　resist，　although　he　admits　that　it　can　be　inevitable　as　a”Naturall
Punishments曾曹（」乙eviathan　253）；not　subjects　but　llNature曹曹itself　punishes　the
sovereign．25　This　happells　when　the　sovereign　breaches　the　law　of　nature
despite　impeccable　obedience　on　the　side　of　his　subjects．　The　point　is　that
there　is　no　justification　fbr　the　people　to　bring　about　the　resistance・
Therefbre，　people　need　not　be　given　a　legitimate　reason　fbr　the　cause　of
resistance．　Resistance　takes　place　in　the　worst　situation　called　the　state　of
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nature，　which　is　outside　the　range　of　Hobbes曹s　civil　theory．　h　other　words，
there　is　no　perspective　within　the　Leviathan　to　comprehend　the　sitUation　of
its　own　death．26　However，　writing　after　the　Glorious　Revolution，　Locke　and
Hume　are　more　realistic　about　the　possibility　of　resistance　to　govemment
than　Hobbes．　Hume　a（㎞its
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　，
As　maUer　wou’d　have　been　created　in　vain，　were　it　dqpriv’d　of　a　power　of
resistance，　without　which　no　part　of　it　cou°d　preserve　a　dist血ct　existence，　and
the　whole．might　be　erowded　up　into　a　single　pOint：So，tis　a　gmss　absurdity
tO　S叩POSe，血my　gOV㎜enちaゆ舳0砿a細y，　Or蛆Ow，㎞t止e
supreme　power　is　shaゴd　wi重h　the　peqple，　witbout　anowing，　that曾tis　law血l
fo曲ern　to　defend　their　share　against　every　inv蜘．　Those，血（紬re，　who
wou’d　seem　to　respect　our　free　government，　and　yet　deny　the　right　of
resis伽㏄，㎞ve　r㎝o㎜cgd蛆嘩nsions　tO　common　sense，　and　do　not　merit
aserious　answer．（T　3．2．10．16）
In　this　way，　Hume　a面its，　as　a　matter　of　”common　sense”，　the　right　of
resistance　so　that　individuals　are　not　deprived　of　their　distinct　existence．
Hume雪s　intelltion　regarding　the　discussion　of　the　right　of　resistance，
however，　is　to　criticise　the　Lockean　social　contract　theory　that　recognises
obedience　as　a　rational　behaviour，　even　though　Locke　by　no　means
encourages　rebellions．27　The血terest　that　is　met　by　obedience　to　government
is　different丘om　the　interest　that　is　served　by　i即lementing　promise．　Hume
says，
And　since　there　is　a　s叩ara重e　interest　in　the　obedi㎝nce　to　governmenち　fbom
that　in　the　perfbrmance　of　promises，　we　must　also　allow　of　a　separate
obhgation．　To　obey　the　civi豆magistrate　is　requisite　to　preserve　order　and
concord　i血s㏄ie隻y．　To　perf（）ml　promises　is　requisite　to　beget　mutual　tnlst
and　confidence　in　the　common　offices　of　life．　The　ends，　as　well　as血e
means，　are　perfbctly　distillct；nor　is　tbe　one　subordhlate　to　the　other．（T
3．2．8．5）
　　The　interests　of　govemment　are　general　and　not　particular　in　that
govemment　provides　a　framework　in　which　people　can　engage　in　their
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business倉eely　without　coming　into　conflict．　Like　nlles　of　a　game　where
fDllowing　the　rules　does　not　directly　contribute　to　a　particular　player
winning，　fbllowing　the　rules　of　justice　does　not　serve　p頒icular　interests．
恥en　the　con往act劇usti丘es血e　resistance　to　government，　his　judgement，
though　alleged　to　be　rational，　can　only　be　based　on　his　particular　interests，
and　the血dividual　interest　is　not　what　govemment　is　meant　to　promote．　It　is
tme　that　the　rules　of　the　game　can　make　the　game　impossible．　Therefbre，
Hume　a（lmits　that　in　extreme　cases　that　resistance　is　inevitable．　The　point　is，
however，　it　is　impossible　to　mark　a　clear　line　beyond　which　the　rebellion
will　clearly　be　preferable　to　the　statUs　quo．　Hume　asserts　that　mtis　certainly
impossibIe　fbr　the　laws，　or　even　fbr　philosophy，　to　establish　any∫particular
rules，　by　which　we　may㎞ow　when　resistance　is　lawfUl；and　decide　all
controversies，　which　may　arise　on　that　subject’°（T　3．2．10・16）・Hume
understands　that　there　is　no　causal　guarantee　that　the　removal　of　the　bad
government　will　produce　good　govemment．　Moreover，　it　has　to　be憾en　into
account　that　resistance　may　bring　with　it　all　the　costs　described　by　Hobbes
as血e　s倣e　of　na血e．　If血e　interest　of血e　govemment　is　order　and　stability，
it　is　contradictory，　at　lease　temporarily，　to　cause　the　disorder　of　resistance　in
order　to　attaill　stability．　Because　the　origin　of　govemment　consists　in　the
secure　administration　of　justice，　the　fact　that　people　in　general　observe　the
mles　ofjustice　indicates　a㎞ctioning　gove㎜ent，　which　is　co嘲to　the
resis伽ce　to　government．　Thus，　Hume　is　reluc伽t　to　sanction　resistance：
1　must　confess，　that　I　shall　always　inchne　to　theh願side，　who　draw　tbe　boIld　of
allegiance　very　close，　and　consi（ler　an　i㎡im’　gement　of　it　as　the　last　refUge血
dθsperate　cases，　wheri　the　public　is　in　the　highest　danger　fr（）m　violence　and
職口y．（E∬の7s，490）
　　One　person曾s　physical　power　is　limited，　and　his　life　is　also　limited，　so　it
does　not　usually　happen　that　people　need　to　ove血㎜the　whole　system　of
justice　simply　because　their　sovereign　is　”bad”．28　Most　of　all，　it　is　absurd　to
suddenly　change　a　whole　system　of　the　government　that　has　lasted　many
centuries（T　3．2．10．14）．　It　is　like　proposing　to　change　the　national　language・
Moreover，　in　a　more　advanced　commercial　society，　it　becomes　more
difficult　for　government　to　conduct　policies　that　are　not　supported　by　at　least
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山epeople　in　geneml．　And　even　if　the　govemment　abuses　people，血ere　is　a
better　way　than　by　violent　rebellion　to　overthrown　it．　Hume　believes　in血e
progress　of　human　society，　its　ability　to　organise　a　moral　point　of　view　in　the
”general　co肛se　of　thingsll伽卿，254）．29　The　more　commercial　society
advances，　the　more出e　social　co㎜皿ication　emiches　the　general　point　of
view．　In　a　civilised　commercial　society，　civil　liberty　is　better　advanced
through　gradual　improvement　than　through　a　political　revolution．
Hume　distinguishes血e　justification　of　the　reigning　govemment　from　the
justification　of　the　system　ofjUstice．　In　westem　democratic　society，　it　is　no
longer　necessary　to　resort　to　unlaw負ユl　means　to　get　rid　of　the　presiding
government．　A　govemment　owes　its　authority　to　the　allegiance　of　the
people，　which　reflects　more　accurately　the　opinion　of　the　people．　If　the
general　point　of　view　does　not　acknowledge　the　govemment，　it　cannot
fUnction　as　govemment，　and　na傭ally　coUapses．　Thus，　in鋤y　case　it　is血e
gelleral　point　of　view　rather　than　the　condition　of　a　contract　that　lets　a
government　stand　or　fall．　In　this　way，　Hume　reveals　that　govemment　is　a
composition　of　the　general　point　ofview．
8．Concluding　Remarks
　　We　have　examined　Hume’s　theory　of　promise　in　reference　to　its　critical
implication　to　the　social　contract　theory。　Hume曾s　criticism　is　decisive　in血at
he　anatomises　the　concept　of　promise　itself，　that　the　social　contract　theory
finds　directly　iガ曾heaven”．　We　can　now　see　that　the　conc〔rpt　of　the　general
point　of　view，　first　formulated　implicitly　in　Hume’s　epistemology，
culminates　in　the　establislment　of　government．　This　indicates　that　Hume’s
Treatise　as　a　whole　has　a　goal　of　establishing　a　consistent　moral　and　political
theory．　Furthermore，　it　is　important　to　recognise　that　Hume　makes　a
㎞damental　revision　ofthe　Hobbesian　and　the　Lockean　political　theories．
Hobbes，　Locke　and　Hume　all　agree　that　political　society　is　formed　as　a
moral　co㎜皿ity；it　is　by　means　of　moral　principles　that　people　constitUte　a
society．　The　fbcal　point　of　their　respective　theories　is　how　individuals　relate
to　the　community　beyond　their　immediate　commitments．　Hobbes　refers　to　a
sovereign　power　as　the　locus　of　an　accumulation　of　the　rights　of　his　subj　ects．
But　Hobbes’s　rationalist　method　of　reconstruction　confers　on　a　single　person
absolute　power，　which　can　produce　despotism．　Most　of　all，　his　negative
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argument　fbr　avoiding　the　worst　situation　is　incapable　of　explaining　the
natural　formation　of　the　moral　institUtions　participated　in　by　people　in
general．　Locke豊s　social　contract　theory　separates　the　justification　of
government丘om血e　explanation　of血e　s㎞伽d　ofjus廿ce．　The　relationshp
of　the　system　of　goverllance　with　the　justification　of　the　presiding
government　is　not　explained．
　　It　is　now　possible　to　see　that　Hume　offbrs　a　consistent　theory　of　society
that　consists　in　1血e　interest　of　stability　of　the　general　public．　The　key　lies　in
the　formation　of　the　beliefs　in　justice　and　govemment．　These・beliefs・are
modelled　on　the　beliefs　in　causation　and　in　extemal　o切ects．　His　theory　of
government　is　founded　upon　his　epistemology．　h　thls　way，　he　provides　his
mora1　and　political　theory　with　the　most　valid　foundation　of　nature．　Hume’s
Treatise　aims　to　understand　the　whole　process　of　human　nature　through
which　people　establish　morality　and　political　society．　It　is　possible　to
recognise　the　general　point　of　view　as　consistently　leading　the　development
of　Hume°s　pr句ect，　and　serving　as　a　normative　concept　in　the　final　instance．30
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Hume　and　Sp血oza㎜id㎝鰍
In　contrast，　Locke　considers　legitimate　resistance　as　an”appeal　to　Heaven”（Two
TreatiSes　379）．　hl　this　case，　punis㎞㎝t　is　done　by　people．
The　idea　of　not　knoWing　one，s　own　death爬且ects　Hobbes「s　Epicurean－and　Democritea　l
influence．　As血翻y　is　composed　of　a舳s，　so　the　commonweal止is　com圃of
血dividuals．
For　an　argurr）ent　of　defendmg　Loeke，　see　Seliger，　Ma血”Locke’s　Natural　Law　and　the
FoundatiOn　ofPolitics鴨，」伽1〔～プ伽伽のリノofldeαs，　vol．24，1963：337－354・
Hume　del血㈱s血s畑t血”Of血e　First　Principle　of　Government曾，血Essays．
H㎜esays伽”it　is　the　chief　business　of　philo…vaphers　tO　regard　the　general　couise　of
things”（Essの15，254）．　This　represents　Hume’s負mdamental　conception　of”t皿e
ph且osqphyl1．
This　study　is　par虹aUy　assisted　by　the’曹Grant一血一Aid　for　Scientific　Resea1℃h”ofJapan
5bc’のりbr　the、Pbeomotion　of　Science（Assignm㎝t　No．1820028）．　I　am　glatefUl　to　Dr．
Jomathan　Hearn，　Prof．　Russell　Keat　and　Prof．　Allan　Blonde　for　precious　commentS　and
editorial　suggestions．
